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Single-Sex “Marriage”: The Role of the Courts∗
Lino A. Graglia∗∗
As a Burkean conservative, I entertain a strong presumption
against change in long-standing basic social arrangements and institutions. However, I will not directly discuss the merits of the singlesex “marriage” issue, as I can make no claim to special competence
in family law. Instead, I will discuss the question whether the refusal
of legislatures to grant some or all of the legal benefits of marriage to
persons of the same sex is prohibited by either the federal or state
constitutions.
It might be noted at the outset that the question must surely
strike anyone not schooled in constitutional law as strange. Is it really
possible that the people of the United States or any state, by adopting a constitution, precluded themselves from defining marriage as
the union of a man and a woman and from granting a privileged
status to such unions? Further, how can it be that distinguishing between marriage and same-sex unions is forbidden by our constitutions and yet no one ever noticed it until just now? The answer, unfortunately, is that in the make-believe world of constitutional law all
things are possible.
The central question of constitutional law is the question of the
proper role of judges in our system of government. This is the only
question common to the myriad issues of social policy—abortion,
prayer in the schools, race discrimination, the rights of the criminally
accused, pornography, and so on—decided by judges in the name of
constitutional law. Every law constitutes a social policy decision
made in the ordinary political process; every ruling of unconstitutionality constitutes a rejection of that policy choice and the substitution of a different policy choice by judges. The American people,
through the process of representative self-government, express their
policy preferences by electing legislators who, on the principle of
separation of powers, are supposedly the sole possessors of lawmak∗ This article was presented at the Symposium on the ALI Principles on the Law of
Family Dissolution, held at Brigham Young University’s J. Reuben Clark Law School on February 1, 2001.
∗∗ A. Dalton Cross Professor in Law, University of Texas School of Law, Austin, Texas.
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ing authority. The policy choices made by elected legislators actually
prevail in our system, however, only insofar as they are not, in the
name of constitutional law, rejected by our judges.1
The willingness and ability of our judges to have the final say on
issues of basic social policy is well illustrated by the recent decisions
regarding the meaning and social value of marriage by the Oregon
Court of Appeals in Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences University 2
and by the Supreme Court of Vermont in Baker v. State.3 The judgment of Western society—indeed, of most human societies—has always been that the union of a man and a woman as the nucleus of a
family, hopefully for life, is essential to the maintenance of a stable,
or even a viable, society. Such unions have, therefore, been given a
unique status—established, encouraged, and protected by innumerable laws, customs, and practices—making marriage as fundamental
an institution to our society and culture as any we have. Many of our
modern-day judges, however, acting solely on the basis of their own
notions of social progress and the scope of their lawmaking authority, have decided that this is all an unfortunate relic of a less enlightened and less well-intentioned past.
How does it happen that these judges, who, after all, have generally been raised and educated in our society, should have such a radically different view of the meaning and value of marriage? Most importantly, what is the source of their authority to make their view
determinative such that we are bound to accept and respect it? The
answer to the first question is that they are merely affirming their adherence to what they consider the more prestigious side in a cultural
conflict. William F. Buckley famously stated that he would rather be
governed by the first two thousand names in the Boston phone book
1. An analogy might be drawn with the situation formerly existing in some South
American countries where elections would be held but the results permitted to stand only to
the extent that they proved acceptable to a military junta. See, e.g., Clandestine Group Calls
for Ouster of Junta, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Nov. 20, 1982, at AM Cycle (Argentina); Bolivians
Ponder Revolt: Who Won?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1981, at A4 (Bolivia); Edward Schumacher,
For Bolivia, Chaos Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1981, at A11 (Bolivia); UNITED PRESS INT’L,
Sept. 29, 1980, at AM Cycle (El Salvador).
2. 971 P.2d 435 (1998) (holding that unmarried homosexual couples qualify as a suspect class for purposes of the privilege and immunities clause of the Oregon Constitution, and
that a university’s denial of insurance benefits to the domestic partners of its homosexual employees violated the Oregon Constitution).
3. 744 A.2d 864 (1999) (holding that the exclusion of same-sex couples from benefits
and protections incident to marriage under state law is a violation of the Vermont Constitution).
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than by the two thousand members of the Harvard faculty.4 This is
surely one of his wisest observations. The Harvard faculty, brilliant as
all the members undoubtedly are, live immersed in a world of words
that enable them to imagine situations and reach conclusions so removed from our social norms that to ordinary persons they would be
literally unthinkable. Brilliance, unfortunately, is not the only, or
perhaps even the most essential, element of good judgment. On the
contrary, it often leads to an overestimation of one’s wisdom and
goodness and ability to rethink and remake the world.
The most serious defect of the form of government we have
permitted to evolve from the form of government created by our
state and federal constitutions is that in effect we are now being
ruled by the Harvard faculty, albeit only through judges, persons
once removed from and not necessarily all quite as brilliant as that
faculty. Our judges, all educated (or at least processed) through college and law school, are the products of Harvard (and, perhaps even
worse, Yale), its equivalents, and its many lesser imitators.
The salient fact of our society at the present day, as many others
have noted,5 is that we are engaged in a culture war. It is a war between our cultural elite, the intelligentsia, and aspiring intelligentsia
(what has been called the “chattering class”)—the dominant force in
our universities and media of communication—on the one hand, and
the ordinary American citizen on the other.6 The average citizen
holds views on a wide range of issues of basic social policy—for example, on capital punishment, prayer in the schools, the permissibility of religious symbols in public places, enforcement of the criminal
law, assignment of children to neighborhood schools, the suppression of pornography, flag burning, and specifically relating to the
4. See William F. Buckley, Jr., Au Pair Case No Reason to Condemn Courts,
HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 8, 1997, at 36, quoted in Lino A. Graglia, Panel IV: Roundtable
Discussion: The Revitalization of Democracy—Revitalizing Democracy, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 165, 171 (2000).
5. For example, Justice Scalia, dissenting in Romer v. Evans, stated:
The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite. The constitutional amendment before us here is not the manifestation of a “‘bare . . . desire to harm’” homosexuals, . . . but is rather a modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to
revise those mores through use of the laws.
517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (citing the majority opinion).
6. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN
LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE (1996).
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point of the conference for which this article was prepared, homosexuality and marriage—that are anathema to our cultural elite. The
difficulty with our system of representative self-government, as the
intelligentsia sees it, is that everyone gets to vote, with the result that
the views of the unenlightened masses are likely to prevail.7
The function of constitutional law, in the view of our cultural
elite and as it has largely operated in recent decades, is to keep this
from happening. The first and most important thing to understand
about constitutional law is that it has very little to do with a constitution. It has become essentially a device or ruse for policymaking by
judges. Such policymaking is much preferred by our cultural elite to
policymaking by the elected representatives of the people because
judges, given a free hand in policymaking, can generally be relied on
to serve as the mirror, mouthpiece, and enacting arm of liberal academia in general and liberal legal academia in particular. Law professors, overwhelmingly well to the left of the American public, are to
judges as the New York Times drama critic is to a playwright.
The second (and final) understanding necessary to a full understanding of constitutional law is that rulings of unconstitutionality
over the past four decades have not been random in their political
impact; on the contrary, they have overwhelmingly served to further
the policy preferences of those on the extreme left of the American
political spectrum. If one wishes to so radically change the meaning
of marriage, for example, as to no longer require the presence of a
man and a woman, one has virtually no chance of succeeding by appealing to an American legislature. The prospect of success is enormously enhanced, however, if the issue can somehow be removed
from the control of legislators and decided instead by judges using
the magic and mystery of constitutional law. This is the only reason
constitutional law has become so pervasive and important and is so
enthusiastically supported and defended in legal academia.
7. For example, Justice William Brennan stated the following in a speech he gave at
Georgetown University on October 12, 1985:
The view that all matters of substantive policy should be resolved through the
majoritarian process has appeal under some circumstances, but I think it ultimately
will not do. Unabashed enshrinement of majoritarianism would permit the
imposition of a social caste system or wholesale confiscation of property so long as
approved by a majority of the fairly elected, authorized legislative body . . . .
Faith in democracy is one thing, blind faith quite another . . . .
William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27
S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 436–37 (1986).
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This magic and mystery is nicely illustrated in the Tanner and
Baker decisions, each holding that some or all of the benefits bestowed by law on marriage must also be bestowed on certain arrangements between same-sex couples.8 In each case the judges
wrote opinions, as is required by convention, purporting to explain
the basis of their decisions. As in almost every case involving a ruling
of unconstitutionality, however, the judges faced the impossible task
of showing that their rulings constituted an exercise of the judicial
rather than the legislative function, that they resulted from the application of law—pre-existing, authoritative rules—rather than from
nothing more than the judges’ own personal policy preferences.
What legal, as opposed to purely personal, justification could the
Tanner and Baker judges possibly offer for their decisions? Where is
it written, do you suppose, in the Oregon and Vermont constitutions that their legislatures may not prefer marriage to same-sex liaisons? In each case, the judges purported to interpret and apply a
provision of their state constitution that is taken to replicate or parallel and usually to extend the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution.9 The Oregon court relied on Article I, section
20 of the Oregon Constitution,10 which provides: “No law shall be
passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all
citizens.”11 The Vermont court relied on Chapter 1, Article 7 of the
Vermont Constitution,12 which provides that “government is, or
ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or community, and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or set of
persons, who are a part only of that community.”13
In each case, the judges read these provisions as if they imposed a
general requirement of equality, even though no such requirement is
possible. The law does not and cannot treat all persons—young and
old, weak and strong, rich and poor, male and female, and so on—as

8. See Tanner v. Or. Health Sciences Univ., 971 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1998); Baker
v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
9. The Fourteenth Amendment provides: “No State shall . . . deny to any person . . .
the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
10. Tanner, 971 P.2d at 445.
11. OR. CONST. art. I, § 20.
12. Baker, 744 A.2d at 869–70.
13. VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 7.
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equal in all regards. The very purpose of law is to classify (discriminate among) people for different treatment; for example, burglary
statutes distinguish burglars from nonburglars. Blacks, women, and
eighteen-year-olds have the right to vote, while aliens and felons do
not, not because of any principle or requirement of equality (or
“equal protection”), but because they were given the right by the
Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments, respectively.
There is no requirement of equality other than the tautology that
all people must be treated in accordance with their legal rights.14
When judges decide that some homosexual unions have the same legal status as marriage, they are not, as they invariably claim, enforcing a legal or constitutional requirement of equality—there is none.
What they are doing instead is legislating for homosexuals rights
other than those granted by the legislature.
Decisions extending marital rights to homosexual unions do so
on no other basis or authority than the fact that full societal acceptance, if not endorsement, of homosexuality is the current cause célèbre in today’s academia. The primary function of judicial opinions
explaining these decisions is to deny or conceal this fact and to perpetuate the fraudulent claim that they are the commands of preexisting law. Thus, the Vermont Supreme Court began its opinion
by insisting that it was merely performing its “constitutional responsibility to consider the legal merits” of the plaintiffs’ claim.15 Its decision, it told us, is “grounded and objective, and not based upon the
private sensitivities or values of individual judges.”16 The court’s only
reason for making this claim, of course, is that it is so obviously untrue. The business of courts, it assured us, quoting Justice Souter, is
“constitutional review, not judicial law making.”17 This insistence
was to be expected from Justice Souter, because he is probably the
judge on the present Supreme Court who is most willing and ready
to engage in law making, just as repeating it was to be expected from
the notoriously activist Vermont Supreme Court. It is no surprise
that a court willing to remake the public school system of Vermont

14. See generally Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537
(1982).
15. 744 A.2d at 867.
16. Id. at 879.
17. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 768 (1997) (Souter, J.,
concurring)).

1018

6GRAL.DOC

1013]

1/9/02 10:12 AM

Single-Sex “Marriage”

to bring it into accord with current academic views on the subject18
would also be willing to remake the law of marriage to achieve the
same end.
There is no surer sign of a court’s determination to evade or defy
the text of a law, constitution, or other document than the court’s
assertion of reliance on the document’s “spirit” rather than its literal
terms. This is what the Vermont Supreme Court relied on, for example, when it held that “spouse” in a Vermont law included a
same-sex homosexual partner.19 In Baker, the court spoke of the
need “to discover . . . the core value” and “distill the essence” of Article 7.20 The core value and essence that it then discovered and distilled, amazingly but predictably, converted Article 7 into a prohibition of the legislature’s continuing to define marriage as the union of
a man and a woman.
Judicial talk of “spirit,” “core values,” and “essences” is simply
conventional rigmarole meant to obfuscate the fact that the court is
effectively writing into law a policy decision the legislature did not
make and would not make. The Baker decision is supported not by
any spirit or essence of Vermont law, but by nothing more than the
judges’ personal view, in accord with current elite opinion, that the
reasons for preferring marriage to homosexual partnerships in granting legal benefits are vestiges of a darker time. It is very difficult to
see, however, why the people of Vermont should agree that on so
basic an issue of social policy it is the view of the judges, a committee
of five lawyers, rather than the views of the people’s elected
representatives, that should prevail.
The reasoning by which the Oregon Court of Appeals disallowed
a law that effectively granted to married couples and their families
certain advantages not granted to persons in other communal arrangements, including homosexual partnerships, is equally unimpressive. With perfect circularity, the court held, in effect, that the legislature’s favoring of marriage over homosexual unions is unconstitutional because the legislature favors and has always favored marriage.21 By granting certain benefits only to married couples and defining marriage as a union of a man and a woman, the Oregon legis-

18.
19.
20.
21.

See Brigham v. Vermont, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997).
See In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1274 (Vt. 1993).
744 A.2d at 874 (citation omitted).
See Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences Univ., 971 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
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lature made homosexuals, the court found, an historically disadvantaged group.22 But historic disadvantage, according to the court, is a
defining characteristic of a “suspect” classification which must be
given strict (“particularly exacting”) scrutiny by judges.23 Strict scrutiny means that the law will be presumed unconstitutional and upheld only if the legislature offers justifications the judges consider
sufficient, a nearly impossible task, especially when the challenged
distinction is based on moral, traditional, or broad social grounds,
rather than on empirically demonstrable utilitarian considerations.
More simply, strict scrutiny means that the judges have decided to
make themselves the final policymakers on the issue involved.
By adopting their state constitutions, the people of the states
precluded themselves, they have learned to their astonishment many
years later, from continuing to grant to the marital relationship the
central privileged status it had always had as the basis of our civilization. This is so, however, not because of anything the people have
done or meant to do, but only because a few lawyers in robes, sharing and willing to impose the views of a cultural elite, have abused
the power of their office in order to declare it so. What, then, can the
people do? Are they really in thrall to the views of five up-to-date,
politically correct lawyers willing to legislate in the guise of interpreting the state constitution? The people of Vermont and Oregon can,
of course, attempt to obtain the supermajority necessary to amend
their state constitutions to overturn the work of their advancedthinking judges, as was done in Hawaii, but this means that the
judges’ view on any social policy issue prevails as long as the small
minority needed to defeat a constitutional amendment supports that
view.
It should be noted that the legal situation in Hawaii was somewhat different from that in Vermont and Oregon. In Baehr v.
Lewin,24 the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that the claim that denial of a marriage license to a same-sex couple violated the Hawaii
Constitution stated a cause of action. The Hawaii Constitution explicitly prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in regard to “civil
rights.” The Baehr court held, correctly in my view, that denial of
marital rights to same-sex couples is sex discrimination (John may

22. See id. at 443.
23. Id. at 446.
24. 852 P.2d 44 (1993).
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marry Mary because he is a man, Joan may not because she is a
woman) and, at least arguably correctly, that the right to marry is a
civil right.
As a participant some years ago in the debates on the proposed
Equal Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution, I argued that a constitutional prohibition of sex discrimination would
inevitably lead to the argument that denial of the right to marry to
same-sex couples is unconstitutional and that the argument could be
expected often to succeed. The argument was dismissed as ludicrous
by proponents of the Equal Rights Amendment, but this is what
happened in Hawaii. Laws, people must learn, particularly laws
stated in sweeping terms, are dangerous things.
The only effective solution to the problem illustrated by the
Baker and Tanner decisions is amendment of the state constitutions,
not merely to overturn these particular unwanted policy decisions,
but to remove definitively from judges the policymaking power they
have assigned themselves in the guise of interpreting the state constitution. State constitutions, like the Federal Constitution, do not explicitly provide for judicial review, the extraordinary and unprecedented power of judges to substitute their policy views for those of
elected legislators. Judges acquired the power only by finding it to
be “implied” in written constitutions.25 State constitutions should be
amended to make clear that judges have no such power and that the
people of the states are sufficiently confident in their power of selfgovernment to be willing to risk it without the supervision and guidance of their judges. There is no single step the people of any state
could take that would contribute more to the restoration of representative self-government and the political health of both their state
and the country.

25. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“This theory is
essentially attached to a written constitution . . . .”).
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